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Post-Revolution Constitutionalism: The Impact 
of Drafting Processes on the Constitutional 
Documents in Tunisia and Egypt* 
by Ahmed El-Sayed** 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to address the constitutional paths that followed the Arab awakening in both Tunisia and Egypt. 
The Tunisian constitutional process, despite some tensions, was largely peaceful and consensual. On the other 
hand, the process in Egypt of establishing a new constitutional arrangement had been tumultuous with 
repercussions that are likely to linger on for a protracted period of time. Therefore, despite apparent resemblance in 
socio-political actors in both countries, (political Islam, army intervention, strong institutional tradition, young 
population, etc.) the paper aims at identifying the factors have impacted both the constitutional drafting process and 
the popular perception of the produced constitutions in each of Tunisia and Egypt.  
I. The Case of Tunisia 
1. First Stage of Transition: Post Ben Ali 
In the aftermath of Ben Ali’s departure, Tunisia had to rapidly find a successor for its long-
sitting dictator. Seeking to fill political vacuum, Ben Ali’s Prime Minister, Mohammed 
Ghanouchi, declared himself the acting president based on Article 56 of the 1959 Constitution 
stating that “[I]n case of temporary disability, the President may, by decree, delegate his 
powers to the Prime Minister […]”. However the application of the Article had two main 
obstacles; the delegation of power did not actually transpire and, most importantly, the 
application of such Article would suggest that the absence of the President is temporary, not 
permanent. Fortunately, the Constitutional Council, the country’s ultimate arbiter on 
constitutional issues at the time,1 intervened declaring that due to the permanent absence of the 
president the situation necessitates the application of Article 572 and thus the head of the lower 
 
* This paper does not offer a comprehensive account on the constitutional processes in Egypt and Tunisia but rather an 
analysis of the significant factors that shaped the constitutional drafting processes.  
** Ahmed El-Sayed studied law at the University of London and Cairo. He currently is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of 
Copenhagen and an Egyptian judge (on leave of absence) at El-Mansoura court of first instance.   
1 Article 75 of the 1959 Constitution stated that: 
“The opinion of the Constitutional Council […] shall be binding on all public authorities [...].” 
2 Article 57 of the 1959 Constitution stated that: 
“In case the Presidency of the Republic becomes vacant on account of death, resignation, or permanent disability, the 
Constitutional Council shall meet immediately and pronounce the permanent vacancy by absolute majority of its members 
[…] the President of the Chamber of Deputies […] shall be invested immediately with the functions of Interim President of 
the Republic for a period of at least 45 days and at most 60 days […].” 
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chamber of parliament, not the prime minster, should serve as interim president. Accordingly, 
Fouad Mebazaa, was declared the interim president of the country.3 Therefore, despite a 
mercurial beginning,4 Tunisia’s institutions were able to overcome the very first test and found 
a replacement for the fleeing President premised on constitutional legitimacy.  
Striving to handle the new polity, on 18 February the government founded the High 
Commission for the Realization of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reforms, and Democratic 
Transition.5 Even form the lengthy title, it could be deduced that the commission’s aim was to 
accommodate the demands of the newly unfolding socio-political forces.6 In particular, the 
Commission’s initial role was to provide a platform of representation for the various … of 
Tunisian society.7 Nevertheless, the government soon realized that although constitutional 
legitimacy was sufficient to provide an interim president, it was certainly not enough for the 
sustainability of the entire political system. The death of at least three protesters prompted the 
Prime Minister, who had served under Ben Ali, to tender his resignation.8 Only days later, 
Mebazaa declared a future roadmap, set a date for the election of a National Constituent 
Assembly (NCA) that would draft a new constitution and ignored the 45- 60 day constitutional 
limit9 on his interim presidency.10 Mebazaa decisively stated that the 1959 Constitution “no 
longer reflects the aspirations of the people after the revolution”,11 paving the way for the 
Decree-Law No. 2011-14 which abolished the 1959 Constitution in its entirety.12  Moreover, the 
High Commission, which was initially formed to play an advisory role, assumed more powers 
and “effectively operated as an unelected parliament.”13 
This hybrid of constitutional and revolutionary legitimacy (legitimacy of transition) gave the 
system whose President and post-revolution Prime Ministers were either closely related to Ben 
Ali’s regime, Mebazaa and Ghanouchi,14 or not among the participants of the 2011 revolution, 
 
3 “Tunisia Constitutional Council Appoints Interim Head of State,” Voice of America, accessed March 5, 2014 
http://www.voanews.com/content/former-tunisian-president-arrives-in-saudi-arabia----113775734/133570.html. 
4 Laurel Miller et al, Democratization in the Arab world: prospects and lessons from around the globe (RAND: Santa Monica, 
CA, 2012), 72. 
5 Asma Nouira, “Obstacles on the Path of Tunisia’s Democratic Transformation,” Carnegie Endowment For International 
Peace: Sada, accessed March 5, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/30/obstacles-on-path-of-tunisia-s-democratic-
transformation/6bej. 
6 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Tunisia’s Morning After: Middle Eastern Upheavals,” Middle East Quarterly, volume XVIII, No 
3 (Summer 2011) 11-17, 14. 
7 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, supra n.6, 14 
8 “Tunisian PM Mohammed Ghannouchi Resigns over Protests,” BBC, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/n 
ews/world-middle-east-12642942. 
9 Article 57 of the 1959 Constitution, supra n.2. 
10 “Tunisia President Fouad Mebazaa Calls Election,” BBC, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www .bbc.co.uk/ news/world-
middle-east-12642942. 
11 “Tunisia President Fouad Mebazaa Calls Election,” supra n.10. 
12 The preamble to the Decree-law no. 201114 dated 23 March 2011stated that: 
“Considering that the current situation […] does no longer allow the regular operation of the public authorities and that the 
full implementation of the constitution provisions has become impossible.” Article one on the same Decree-Law also stated 
“The public authorities in the Republic of Tunisia shall be provisionally organized in accordance with the provisions of this 
decree […].” 
13 Laurel Miller et al, supra n.4, 72. 
14 See e.g. Kim Willsher, “Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi Resigns amid Unrest,” The Guardian, accessed 
March 5, 2014. 
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(El- Sebsi)15 an opportunity to run the country until the election of the NCA. However, this 
relatively fragile system faced a veritable test when elections were delayed from July until 
October upon the request of the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE).16 Officially 
this decision, which the government was not in favor of, was purely due to technical 
difficulties.17 Some surmise that the underlying motive for the delay was to allow non-Islamist 
parties, who lacked any organizational advantage, more time to prepare for the election.18 Be 
that as it may, the decision, which was approved by the High Commission19 and initiated by 
the ISIE (whose 16 members were appointed by the High Commission),20 questioned the 
authority of the Commission and the scope of its mandate.21 Rejecting the decision, El-Nahda, 
Tunisia’s main Islamist party, suspended its participation in the High Commission until the 
election date was concretized.22 However, El-Sebsi, the sitting prime Minister, was able to 
develop “enough credibility that by June he was able to persuade the public and the parties to 
accept a postponement […] Tunisia’s Islamists, who had the most to lose […] accepted the 
deferral.”23 
However, the High Commission was able to offer crucial services for the transitional process. 
Most importantly, it drafted “a law governing the election of a Constituent Assembly [NCA]”24 
and, as already mentioned, appointed the members of the ISIE, which administered the 
electoral process.25 Ultimately, both the Commission and the government managed to move 
forward despite a number road blocks26 and Tunisia was able to hold its first fair and free 
elections in October 2011. This election ushered in the second stage of the transitional process, 
this time the country would be run, perhaps for the first time ever, by elected officials.  
 
 
 
15 “Interim Tunisian Leader With Ties to Old Ruler Defends a Gradual Path,” NY Times, accessed March 5, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/world/africa/tunisias-interim-leader-essebsi-defends-gradualistpath.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0. 
16 “Tunisia’s Interim Government Delays Election,” BBC, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-13702372. 
17 “Tunisia’s Interim Government Delays Election,” supra n.16. 
18 Erik Churchill, “Tunisia’s Electoral Lesson: The Importance of Campaign Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment For International 
Peace: Sada, accessed March 5, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/27/tunisia-s-electoral-lesson-importance-of-
campaign-strategy/6b7g. Although it is to be noted that among those who opposed the delay was the Progressive Democratic 
Party (PDP), a secular party. Laurel Miller et al., supra n.4, 72. 
19 “Tunisian Interim Government Delays Constituent Assembly Elections,” World Socialist Web Site, accessed March 5, 2014, 
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/06/tuni-j29.html. 
20 “Its [ISIE] members were not elected, but appointed by the High Authority for the Realization of the Goals of the 
Revolution, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition.” Elections in Tunisia: Selection of the New Independent High Authority 
for Elections Frequently Asked Questions (International Foundation for Electoral Systems: Middle East and North Africa, 
January 24, 2014), 2. 
21 Laurel Miller et al, supra n.4, 72. 
22 “Key Tunisian Party Pulls out of Election Talks,” Financial Times, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/ 
cms/s/0/744473ac-8ba0-11e0-a725-00144feab49a.html#axzz2v6oHtAQM. 
23 “Interim Tunisian Leader With Ties to Old Ruler Defends a Gradual Path,” NY Times, accessed March 5, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/world/africa/tunisias-interim-leader-essebsi-defends-gradualistpath.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0. 
24 Laurel Miller et al, supra n.4, 72. 
25 Laurel Miller et al, supra n.4, 72. 
26 For instance, the Commission could not entertain some of demands to devise supra-constitutional principles to restrict the 
conduct of the Constituent Assembly in the drafting process. Laurel Miller et al., supra n.4, 73-74. 
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2. Remarks on the First Stage of the Transition 
The most remarkable feature and what largely distinguishes Tunisian politics from most of the 
Arab world and Africa is the largely apolitical role of the army.27 The Tunisian army has 
proven that it well earned the title of the dormant giant.28 Even with the political vacuum 
caused by the unanticipated escape of Ben Ali, the army still abstained from taking part, at 
least overtly, in the political process. Some expected that even with the un-politicized track 
record of the army, it would have been challenging for an army that was developed in a 
secular tradition to risk allowing religious powers to take hold of the country. Nevertheless the 
military kept a distance from politics, sending a message that “Tunisian republicanism will 
continue to uphold the values of liberty, brotherhood, and equality, but add religion, reflecting 
a willingness to coexist with the social and political realities of the country.”29 Such message set 
the stage for a political competition where no one should anticipate an outsider’s help i.e. from 
the army. 
Secondly, although political instability had inflicted heavy costs on the country’s security and 
economy, it rendered the governing system susceptible to pressure and more attentive to the 
demands of the political forces. Therefore, it was no surprise that at an early stage Ben Ali’s 
Prime Minister had to resign,30 the 1959 Constitution was abolished31 and the High 
Commission, which provided an adequate representation of the Tunisian society, assumed the 
role of a parliament.32 In addition, the transitional authority did not stay for long in power, the 
transition from Ben Ali to the NCA had transpired in almost ten months (from January to 
October 2011). Therefore, both flexibility and the relatively rapid hand over of power to an 
elected body allowed the Tunisian system to avoid collapse and serious challenges to its 
governing legitimacy.  
Regarding the NCA, in addition to its basic mission to draft a constitution, the NCA was given 
the power to both decide its bylaws and run the country throughout the second phase of 
transition.33 Given these expansive powers, the NCA was designed to be an extremely 
powerful institution with no clear limitations on the discharge of such powers. Accordingly, it 
was quite foreseeable that the NSA’s design would allow for two potential pitfalls; drafting a 
constitution based on political weight not consensualism34 and the absence of accountability 
criteria.35 Even though the main political parties agreed that the NSA’s mandate should not 
exceed one year, the agreement was “non-binding and many people assume that it will not be 
honored.”36  
 
27 See Yezid Sayigh, “The Tunisian Army—A New Political Role?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 
March 6, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/31/tunisian-army-new-political-role/8msb. 
28 Yezid Sayigh, supra n.27. 
29 Yezid Sayigh, supra n.27. 
30 “Tunisian PM Mohammed Ghannouchi Resigns over Protests,” supra n.8. 
31 The preamble to the Decree-law no. 201114 dated 23 March 2011, supra n.12. 
32 Laurel Miller et al, supra n.4, 72. 
33 Daphne McCurdy, A Guide to the Tunisian Elections (Project on Middle East Democracy, October 2011), 3. 
34 See Zaid Al-Ali and Donia Ben Romdhane, Tunisia’s new constitution: progress and challenges to come (open democracy, 
February 2014), 2.  
35 Laurel Miller et al, supra n.4, 76. 
36 Daphne McCurdy, supra n.33, 3. 
“All political parties represented in the High Authority for the Achievement of Revolutionary Objectives [High 
Commission], except for the Congress for the Republic (CPR), signed a declaration on Sept 15, 2011, limiting the timeframe of 
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3. Second Stage of Transition: Power Structure under the NCA 
On November 14, the ISIE declared the results of the October 23 National Constituent 
Assembly election. Out of 217 seats, El-Nahda (Tunisia’s main Islamic party) came in first with 
89 seats (41%) and Congrès pour la République (CPS) came second with only 29 seats.37 Despite 
El-Nahda’s comfortable victory, it was not sufficient for the party to rule alone. At an early 
stage, therefore, the election outcome forced political actors to play politics not ideology; 
majority is required to control, coalition is required to obtain majority and compromise is the 
key to pour ideologically-diverse, lacking majority political parties into a coalition. 
Furthermore, parties had to consider consensus seriously, not only because of its validity as a 
constitutional-building foundation, but also because it seemed the only way to deliver in a 
fractured political setting.  
These two considerations, which may appear as two sides of the same coin, played out 
robustly in the conduct of the NCA both politically and procedurally. Regarding the former, an 
otherwise unlikely coalition, known as Troika, was forged between El-Nahda, CPR and 
Ettakattol (left-wing secular parties) reaching a majority of 139 seats.38 This coalition was 
further manifested in the distribution of what was called “the three presidencies” even before 
the convocation of the NCA.39 Following the Troika agreement,40 the NCA elected the president 
of republic, prime minister and head of the NCA from the CPR, El-Nahda and Ettakattol 
respectively. Procedurally speaking, although it was only required to obtain absolute majority 
vote (fifty percent + 1) to approve a constitutional article, the draft constitution in its entirety 
had to pass two-thirds majority (145 votes out of 217) to become a constitution.41 Otherwise, 
two failures of the draft to pass this threshold would trigger a popular referendum on the 
draft. If the draft that failed to pass by NCA went to popular referendum, the party unwillingly 
to make compromises during the drafting process would be perceived by the public as a 
consensus-hampering force, with the potential to suffer serious political losses.42  
In respect of the NCA’s mandate, the early settlement of the political map allowed the NCA to 
promulgate the Constituent Law pertaining to the Provisional organization of Public 
Authorities (provisional constitution also dubbed mini constitution).43 Article two of the 
provisional constitution stated that: 
                                                                                                                                                                         
NCA activities to one year.” The Carter Center Encourages Increased Transparency and Public Participation in Tunisia’s 
Constitution Drafting Process; Calls for Progress Toward Establishment of Independent Election Management Body (The 
Carter Center, May 11, 2012), 3. 
37 “National Constituent Assembly Election Results Announced in Tunisia,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 
accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/News-in-Brief/2011/Nov/National-Constituent-Assembly-
Election-Results-Announced-in-Tunisia.aspx. 
38 Amine Ghali, “Tunisia’s Constitutional Process: The Road Ahead,” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace: Sada, 
accessed March 6, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/09/tunisia-s-constitutional-process-road-ahead/84zy. 
39 “Primary agreement on sharing the three presidencies in Tunisia”, (in Arabic), DW, accessed March 6, 2014, 
http://www.dw.de/ قافتا-يئدبم-ىلع-مساقت-تاسائرلا-ثلاثلا-يف-سنوت /a-15543511; “How Will the First Session of the Constituent Assembly 
Be Held?”, tunisialive, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/18/how-will-the-first-session-of-the-
constituent-assembly-be-held/ 
40 “Primary agreement on sharing the three presidencies in Tunisia”, supra n.39. 
41 Article three of the Constituent Law pertaining to the Provisional organization of Public Authorities (Tunisian Provisional 
Constitution) 
42 See n. 85 and related text. 
43 “Tunisian Assembly Adopts Provisional Constitution,” Al Jazeera English, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/12/201112115101550490.html. 
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The NCA assumes the primary responsibility of drafting a constitution for the Tunisian 
republic and assumes specifically the following tasks:  
Exercising legislative authority 
Electing the president of the NCA 
Electing the president of the republic 
Monitoring the government performance [emphasis added] 
Accordingly, after the October election, Tunisia had a fully-fledged parliament, provisional 
constitution, Constituent Assembly and, though indirectly, an elected Prime Minister (hailing 
from the majority party) and a president.44 A complete state structure, therefore, existed after 
the election where the NCA remained the most powerful institution exercising both 
constitution-making and parliamentary functions.45 Accordingly, the claim that Tunisia 
decided to promulgate a constitution before parliamentary and presidential elections46 may be 
questionable. 
The second legal document that governed the drafting process, in addition to the provisional 
constitution, was the NCA’s rules of procedure (henceforth bylaws).47 Most importantly, the 
bylaws established a Joint Committee for Coordination and Drafting (JCCD) to, inter alia, 
coordinate between constitutional committees and prepare a final draft of the constitution (Art. 
103 and 104). Nonetheless, whether in the provisional constitution or the bylaws, there was no 
“legal obligation to complete the draft constitution by a given deadline.”48  
The first real test of ideologies and readiness to compromise was soon to materialize; the role of 
Shari’a in the new constitutional order. Before the October election, El-Nahda’s position was to 
maintain the wording of Article one of the 1959 Constitution, which recognized Islam as the 
religion of the country, without seeking any constitutionalization of Shari’a.49 After the 
election, nevertheless, there were indicators that party would prefer granting Shari’a the status 
of a source or even the main source of legislation.50 Such uncertainty led to heated debate, 
resulting in weeks of pro- and anti-Shari’a street protests.51 Ettakattol took a firm position 
declaring its withdrawal from the Troika coalition should there has been any mention of 
Shari’a in the constitutional draft.52 
 
44 “Tunisian assembly elect Moncef Marzouki as interim president” The National, accessed March 6, 2014, available at 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/tunisian-assembly-elect-moncef-marzouki-as-interim-president; 
"Tunisia's first democratically elected government sworn in", France24, accessed March 6, 2014, available at 
http://www.france24.com/en/20111225-tunisia-new-government-sworn-in-office-carthage-presidential-palace-jebali. 
45 The NCA was as its name suggested “a constituent assembly, and not merely a constitutional convention.” Bill Proctor and 
Ikbal Ben Moussa, The Tunisian Constituent Assembly’s By-laws: A Brief Analysis (International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, September 2012), 15. 
46  E.g. Jason Gluck, Constitutional Reform in Transitional States: Challenges and Opportunities Facing Egypt and Tunisia (United 
States Institute of Peace, April 2011). 
47 Rules of Procedure adopted on 16 December 2011. For detailed information about the NCA’s rules of procedure see Bill 
Proctor and Ikbal Ben Moussa, supra n.45.  
48 Bill Proctor and Ikbal Ben Moussa, supra n.45, 12. 
49 Duncan Pickard, “The Current Status of Constitution Making in Tunisia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
accessed March 28, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/current-status-of-constitution-making-in-tunisia/ah1s.  
50 For example “[a]t a protest on March 16, the president of the Ennahda parliamentary group, Sahbi Atig, shouted that 
sharia would be ‘the main source of legislation’ […]”Duncan Pickard, supra n.49. 
51 Duncan Pickard, supra n.49. 
52 Duncan Pickard, supra n.49. 
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Facing escalating pressure, El-Nahda felt the need to end the debate stating that the party 
would not pursue any Shari’a stipulation in the constitution referencing a number of reasons 
including; an ambiguous referral to Shari’a might lead to misinterpretation by the judiciary or 
public and the need to focus on the country’s more pressing issues.53 Al-Ghanouchi, the 
founder of El-Nahda, in what seems to be a leaked video, provided an arguably more sincere 
and honest reason; in his response to a Salafi sheik, Al-Ghanouchi said “in practice what makes 
laws is not the constitution but the balance of power”,54 and that when Tunisian society is 
ready, Article one will be enough to promulgate Islam-based laws.55 
Be that as it may, at an early stage, El-Nahda successfully evaded a major landmine that could 
have brought the Troika coalition to an end. Nonetheless, a more intricate challenge of a 
political nature was yet to come, namely the type of the political system to be established. This 
challenge, unlike the question of Shari’a, was considerably time and effort consuming,56 with 
El-Nahda insisting on a parliamentary system with a weak, indirectly elected president, while 
other civil and secular parties, including the ones in the ruling Troika coalition, favoring semi 
or fully presidential system.57 All concerned parties cited reasons justifying their positions, for 
instance El-Nahda stated that the parliamentary paradigm is more compatible with the Islamic 
principle of Shura, consultation, and thus inherently worthy of being adopted.58 In fact, while 
acknowledging the validity of some reasons mentioned in support of one system or another, it 
is reasonable to believe that each side was acting in accordance with its own narrow party 
interest. El-Nahda, which garnered 40% of the NCA seats, believed that in a fractured political 
setting, this percentage would still grant it the leading position. Despite polarization, other 
secular and civil parties hoped to overcome their differences and agree on a candidate who 
would be capable of reaping the remaining 60% of the votes.59  
In the meanwhile, other factors contributed to further widen the gap between Islamists and 
secularists. In fact, there was a growing conviction that the El-Nahda led government was 
intentionally reluctant to take any legal or political action vis-à-vis radical and violent groups 
“to cultivate deniable ‘proxies’ with which to intimidate political opponents.”60 Against this 
backdrop, the assassination of opposition leader Chokri Belaid (February 2013) largely 
shattered the already fragile trust between both camps.61 
 
53 Duncan Pickard, supra n.49. 
54 “Communication téléphonique entre Rached Ghannouchi et Béchir Ben Hassine,” businessnewscomtn, [Video file- in 
Arabic], retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2S-PLXId6Aw. 
55 “Communication téléphonique entre Rached Ghannouchi et Béchir Ben Hassine,” businessnewscomtn, supra n.54 
56 A few days before the voting on the final constitutional draft, the NCA voted down Article 90 that distributes powers 
between the president and the prime minster. Duncan Pickard, “Voting on the Tunisian Constitution,” Atlantic Council, 
accessed March 28, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource /voting-on-the-tunisian-constitution.  
57 Duncan Pickard, Lessons from Constitution-Making in Tunisia (Atlantic Council, September 2012), 3-4. 
Bill Proctor and Ikbal Ben Moussa, supra n.45, 12. 
58 Duncan Pickard, supra n.57, 3. 
59 Duncan Pickard, supra n.57, 3-4. 
60 “Why Tunisia's leaders must resist urge for power grab”, CNN, accessed March 5, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2013/02/13/opinion/tunisia-political-crisis/. 
61 “Tunisia: Chokri Belaid assassination prompts protests,” BBC, accessed March 15, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
21349719. 
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In an attempt to restore confidence, Prime Minster Hamadi Jebali, from El-Nahda party, called 
for a “non-partisan, technocratic government”.62 Nonetheless, failing to secure support from 
his party, he was forced to resign and another Islamist took over, Ali Larayedh.63 It is true that 
El-Nahda refused to accommodate the opposition’s strong demand to form a technocratic 
government, but the NCA’s bylaws did witness a very significant amendment; the Joint 
Committee of the NCA was replaced by a “Consensus Committee, in which each political 
group was given equal weight to all others.”64 This step managed to restore much of the 
needed confidence and the Committee was entrusted to work on the June 2013 constitutional 
draft hoping to resolve lingering political disagreement.65 
Nonetheless, further setbacks were yet to transpire both regionally and domestically. The 
ouster of the regime of the Muslim brotherhood (MB) in Egypt, the assassination of the second 
opposition leader Mohamed Brahmi (July 2013),66 and the killing of eight army soldiers (July 
2013)67 gravely exacerbated the situation between the Islamists and secularists, leading to mass 
street protests and full suspension of the NCA in August 2013.68 Fearing the worst and seeking 
to contain the political crisis, the El-Nahda government declared the Salafist Ansar al-Shari’a a 
terrorist group, a decision that irreversibly69 ended the so called “accomodationist” approach 
that El-Nahda was pursuing towards extreme Salafist groups but did little to fix the 
deteriorated political status quo.70  
Given the failure of political players to maintain a trustworthy relationship, actors of civil 
society felt the necessity of their intervention. Tunisia’s “largest trade unions, the lawyers 
association, and one of the country’s largest human rights associations (who were together 
referred to as the ‘Quartet’)” brokered negotiations between the government and the 
opposition, which led to a reconciliatory agreement.71 The most important term of the 
agreement was the consent of El-Nahda to form a technocratic government;72 only then did the 
process pick up, leading to the adoption, with 200 votes from 216, of a permanent constitution; 
the Tunisian Constitution of 2014.73 Ultimately, an overwhelming consensus had been achieved 
 
62 “Tunisia: Ali Larayedh named new prime minister”, BBC, accessed March 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
21550375.  
63 “Tunisia: Ali Larayedh named new prime minister”, supra n.62. 
64 Zaid Al-Ali and Donia Ben Romdhane, supra n.34, 3. 
65 Alexis Arieff and Carla E. Humud, Political Transition in Tunisia (Congressional Research Service, January 2014), 3-4. 
66 “Since Brahmi’s July assassination and the military’s overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the positions of 
Tunisia’s secular opposition have hardened considerably.” Anouar Boukhars, In the Crossfire: Islamists’ Travails in Tunisia 
(Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, January 2014), 9. 
67 “Eight Soldiers Killed in Chaambi Mountain Attack,” tunisialive, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.tunisia-
live.net/2013/07/29/eight-soldiers-killed-in-chaambi-mountain-attack. 
68 “Tunisia constituent assembly suspended pending talks”, BBC, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.bbc .com /news/world-
africa-23596640. 
69 The crackdown on Salafists effectively started after an attack on the U.S. Embassy in September 2012. Alexis Arieff and 
Carla E. Humud, supra n.65, 7. 
70 See Anouar Boukhars, supra n.66, 9. 
71 “Islamist Party in Tunisia to Step Down,” NY Times, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2013 
/09/29/world/africa/islamist-party-in-tunisia-to-step-down.html?_r=0. 
72 “Mehdi Jomaa takes office [10 Jan 2014] to lead caretaker government until elections as part of democratic transition 
agreement.” “Tunisia's new prime minister takes office,” Aljazeera, accessed March 11, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/ 
news/africa/2014/01/tunisia-new-prime-minister-takes-of. 
73 “Tunisia assembly passes new constitution,” BBC, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.bbc .com /news/world-africa-
23596640. 
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in a considerably fractured, polarized, post-revolution political stage, ushering in the third and 
hopefully the final stage of transition, i.e. parliamentary and presidential elections.  
4. Successful Transition  
a) Contingency Approach   
The largely successful Tunisian experience begs the question: what made it work in Tunisia 
and not elsewhere is the Arab awakening countries? The answer seems to lie in the 
organizational management concept of contingency:  
According to the contingency approach there are no plans, organisation structures, leadership 
styles, or controls that can be applied under all conditions. Instead, every management 
situation must be approached with the “it all depends attitude”…. Managerial action, thus, 
depends upon circumstances within a given situation. No one best approach will work in all 
situations. Applying a contingency/situational approach requires that managers diagnose a 
given situation and adapt to meet the conditions present.74  
Being mindful of this notion, the Tunisian administration of the transitional period could be 
largely deemed contingency-oriented; in a sense that a host of decisive measures were tailored 
to meet the exigencies of the moment with neither political fixation nor legal stubbornness. 
This ability to mostly act timely and adequately largely shaped the course of the whole process 
and set the stage for establishing consensus. In other words, the relative success of the Tunisian 
case was, at least partially, an outcome of institutional behavior and conscious decisions that 
rendered consensus a prerequisite for a legitimate and peaceful transition. While 
acknowledging the importance of other factors that further boosted a consensual solution such 
as the presence of an accommodating and moderate leader like Al-Ghanouchi of the El-Nahda 
party, the ouster of former President Morsi in Egypt and the high level of awareness of the 
Tunisian society,75 the next section sheds light on other decisions and factors that played a 
substantial role in neutralizing the danger of the tyranny of the majority.76   
b) Consensus: Reality not a Choice 
The core factor that enabled Tunisia to wade through its second stage of transition was the 
unwavering need to maintain consensus. As challenging as it was, consensus was not a matter 
of choice but rather a reality that political actors had to submit to due to a number of well 
thought out decisions, and factors that further boosted the need for political inclusiveness.  
Electoral Formula: In his detailed analysis, John M. Carey presents a staggering fact, had Tunisia 
“chosen the other most common formula for converting votes to seats, the d’Hondt Divisor 
 
74 V S P Rao & Hari V Krishna, Management: Text and Cases, (Excel Books: New Delhi, 2005), 84. 
75 E.g. David Pollock, “First Islamist Party to Voluntarily Give Up Power: A New Tunisian Model?,” The Washington Institute, 
accessed March 5, 2014, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/first-islamist-party-to-voluntarily-give-
up-power-a-new-tunisian-model. 
76 “[…] majoritarian systems not tempered by constitutional restraints on the exercise of power have a tendency to denigrate 
into a ‘tyranny of the majority.’ It is this tension between majoritarian sovereignty and minority protection that has marked 
democratic theory from its very beginning.”  
Ebrahim Afsah, “Constitution-Making in Islamic Countries- A Theoretical Framework,” in Rainer Grote & Tilmann Röder 
(eds.) Constitutionalism in Islamic countries: between upheaval and continuity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 491. 
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(D’HD) method – Ennahda would have won 69% of the Assembly seats and been in a position 
to impose a new constitution unilaterally.”77 In fact, the Tunisian High Commission opted for 
an electoral formula known as Hare Quota with Largest Remainders (HQ-LR), which was 
advantageous to small parties and substantially affected the eventual political landscape. 
Therefore El-Nahda, which garnered 37% of votes in the October 2011 election, only occupied 
around 41% of the NCA seats.78 
Moderates versus Secularists: The protagonists of the second phase were the Islamists of El-
Nahda on the one hand, and civil and liberal forces on the other. The absence of the Tunisian 
army from the political game made it clear to secular forces that they had to fight their battles 
on their own without outside help. Nonetheless, it was not only the army that was out of the 
scene. The usually disregarded decision of Tunisian government, prior to the October election, 
to ban Salafist groups from running elections79 had an equal impact on political Islam in 
Tunisia.  
Post-revolution, Tunisia witnessed a boom in the number of political parties representing all 
walks of life.80 Nevertheless, based on Tunisia’s political party law, “a number of Islamist 
political parties were not granted party accreditation in order to contest the elections, including 
Hizb Al-Tahrir […]”81 Initial estimates tended to underestimate the influence and number of 
Salafist groups82 but the “rise of salafism in Tunisia has been both surprising and 
problematic.”83 No one can predict what the result would have been had radical groups been 
allowed to run elections; but as a result, El-Nahda lost a potential ally that could have boosted 
the position of political Islam in the NCA.84 On the contrary, the failure to translate the 
presence of the Salafi groups into seats in the NCA completely dismissed the subsequent 
rapprochement between El-Nahda and Salafism as a sponsorship of radicalization, not as an 
alliance between two political parties.85 
Need to Reach Consensus Shaped the Procedure of the NCA: The abovementioned measures 
had, at least in part, affected the electoral outcome. Islamists came in short of achieving a 
qualifying majority, triggering the need for a coalition with ideologically different parties and 
promoting rhetoric of consensus. The most important manifestation of this tendency was 
Article two of the provisional constitution, which necessitated the approval of two-thirds + one 
of the NCA to pass the constitution. Setting a high bar meant that the only way to prove their 
 
77 John M. Carey, Electoral Formula and the Tunisian Constituent Assembly (Dartmouth, May 2013), 1. 
78 John M. Carey, supra n.79. 
79 Kevin Casey “A Crumbling Salafi Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace: Sada, accessed March 5, 2014 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/08/21/crumbling-salafi-strategy/gjkq.  
80 “Whereas only nine registered political parties contested elections under Ben Ali’s regime, post-revolutionary Tunisia 
boasted 113 registered political parties and independents.” Laryssa Chomiak, Countries at the Crossroads: Tunisia (Freedom 
House, 2012), 3. 
81 Laryssa Chomiak, supra n.80, 3-4. 
82 E.g., Moncef Marzouki, the president of Tunisia once commented of Salafists saying “they are a tiny minority within a tiny 
minority.” “Violent tide of Salafism threatens the Arab spring”, The Guardian, accessed March 10, 2014, http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/09/violent-salafists-threaten-arab-spring-democracies. 
83 Stefano M. Torelli, Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta,“ Salafism in Tunisia: Challenges and Opportunities for 
Democratization,” Middle East Policy, volume XIX, No 4 (Winter 2012), 1. 
84 While acknowledging that the majority of the Salafist groups do not recognize modern political structure, an ideological 
shift could have happened, similar to Egypt, if they were given the chance to participate in the NCA election to draft the 
constitution. 
85 See “Why Tunisia's leaders must resist urge for power grab”, supra n.60. 
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trustworthiness political parties had to reach consensus. The referral to a public referendum 
would have been construed as a failure of the participant parties to resolve their 
disagreements. For that reason, the Joint Committee was replaced by the Consensus committee 
where political parties were equally represented to facilitate the creation of consensus.86 
Absence of Time Limit: In hindsight, the absence of a time limit on the work of the NCA had 
benefited the process. Having to deliver within certain time frame could have led to a hasty 
outcome, legal impasse, or questioning the legal legitimacy of the process by surpassing the 
deadline. The absence of such restriction allowed the NCA the time to overcome many of the 
tensions it encountered and to reach modus vivendi, allowing for a consensual constitution. 
Civil Society and Nida Tounis: The presence of strong labor unions, syndicates, and a vibrant 
civil society in general, made it possible for civil actors to sponsor negotiations that led to the 
process-saving agreement between the opposition and the government. This role was best 
complemented by the political counterweight introduced to the stage by the emergence of 
Nida Tounis under the leadership of El-Sebsi which eventually offered a platform for the 
fractured civil and secular opposition.87 This political balance rendered consensus a desirable 
and safer option rather than a public referendum with unpredictable results.88 
II. The Egyptian Case 
1. Post Mubarak 
Though the first political role of the Egyptian army dates back to 1881, such role was usually 
justified, specifically in 188189 and 1952, to intercept foreign interference or end occupation. 
Therefore, it was no surprise that Egyptian protestors were jubilant to see army troops, even 
prior to declaring any positions, on the street during the course of the 2011 revolution.90 
Building on this psyche, neither Mubarak nor Egyptians found it problematic to mandate the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is not mentioned in any form in the 1971 
Constitution, to run the transitional period.91 The reported role of the army in toppling 
Mubarak,92 barren political life, the leaderless revolution, and the notorious reputation of the 
 
86 Zaid Al-Ali and Donia Ben Romdhane, supra n.64. 
87 By April 2013, Nida Tounis was “running almost even with Ennahda in all public opinion polls.” Marina Ottaway, 
Learning Politics in Tunisia, (Wilson Center, April 2013), 2; Anouar Boukhars, supra n.66, 9. 
88 Arguably, the rising popularity of Nida Tounis had deterred El-Nahhda from considering a public referendum as a no vote 
could have probably largely boosted the position of Nida Tounis at the expense of El-Nahhda.   
89  E.g. “In 1881 Egyptian army officers led by Arabi Pasha went into open revolt. This was a genuine nationalist movement 
against all foreign interference in Egyptian affairs [...]” Roger Parkinson, The late Victorian Navy: The pre-dreadnought era and 
the origins of the First World War (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2008), 48.  
“The Nasserite era [named after Jamal Abdel Nasser the actual leader of the 1952 coup d’état] […] overthrew the Egyptian 
monarchy and government, ended the occupation of the British [...]” Amal Treacher Kabesh, Postcolonial masculinities: 
emotions, histories and ethics, (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 120.  
90 “Egyptian military became one of the heroes of the 2011 revolution [...]” The now-famous cries from the demonstrators—
“The army and the people are one hand!” William J Dobson, The dictator's learning curve: Tyranny and democracy in the modern 
world (London: Vintage Books, 2013), 255. 
91 In a televised speech, Omar Suliman, Mubarak’s vice president declared that Mubarak waived the office of presidency and 
delegated the SCAF to run the country’s affairs. “Hosni Mubarak resigns as president,” Aljazeera, accessed March 5, 2014 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121125158705862.html. 
92 Paul Danahar, The new Middle East: The world after the Arab Spring, (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 56. 
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1971 Constitution, specifically after the 2005 and 2007 amendments,93 rendered the non-
constitutional rule of the SCAF justified if not welcomed. 
Few days after Mubarak’s departure, the SCAF timed its political role to six months, 
suspended the 1971 Constitution, and appointed a committee of experts to introduce a number 
of amendments to the suspended constitution.94 Amending the Constitution appeared to be an 
awkward decision for, at the very least, two main reasons; the sheer breach of the suspended 
constitution should have led to its demise not amendment and the irony of reviving a 
constitution that did not mention the SCAF, even by way of example, in any constitutional 
clause, let alone the ruling of the country. Nevertheless, almost five weeks after toppling 
Mubarak, the SCAF held a constitutional referendum on March 19, 2011 (hereinafter March 
referendum) where voters were required to either approve or disapprove eight amendments to 
the 1971 Constitution and an abrogation of one of its articles.  
The amendments and the abrogation were overwhelming approved by almost 77% of the 
voters.95 It was thus reasonable to expect the reinstatement of the 1971 constitution. However, 
the SCAF, finally realizing the impossibility of reinstating a constitution that did not recognize 
the junta, in a tragicomic twist, declared on the SCAF Facebook page that the 1971 Constitution 
was replaced by a new constitutional declaration (provisional constitution).96 The so called 
constitutional declaration committed four travesties that completely dismissed any validity of 
the constitutional referendum. Firstly, the referendum included an abrogation of Article 179 of 
the 1971 Constitution which meant that abolishing a constitutional article required popular 
approval.97 However, although the 1971 Constitution was 211 articles, the constitutional 
declaration was only 63 articles and thus, unilaterally, the SCAF repealed tens of articles 
without any popular consultation.98 Secondly, although the declaration’s articles were mostly 
derived from the replaced constitution, sometimes they were considerably different.99 Thirdly, 
in order to authorize the SCAF’s ruling of the country until the election of the two chambers of 
parliament and a president, brand new articles, such as Article 61, was added.100 Fourthly, and 
most ironically, an approved article by the referendum was amended arbitrarily by the SCAF. 
The approved wording of Article 189 stated that “[B]oth the president, after the consent of the 
cabinet of ministers, and half the members of the chambers of parliament have the right to 
request a new constitution […]” in contrast, according to Article 60 of the declaration, only the 
 
93 E.g. Dafna Hochman Rand, Roots of the Arab Spring: Contested authority and political change in the Middle East (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 64-65. 
94 “On February 13, 2011, the SCAF dissolved parliament and suspended the 1971 constitution. It then established an eight-
member committee of experts to draft amendments to that constitution.” Elections in Egypt: The Electoral Framework in Egypt’s 
Continuing Transition: February 2011 – September 2013 (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, October 2013), 2. 
95 Elections in Egypt: The Electoral Framework in Egypt’s Continuing Transition: February 2011 – September 2013, supra n.94. 
96 Nathan J. Brown and Kristen Stilt, "A Haphazard Constitutional Compromise," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
accessed March 28, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/11/haphazard-constitutional-compromise/2q1. 
97 Nathan J. Brown and Kristen Stilt, supra n.96 
98 Nathan J. Brown and Kristen Stilt, supra n.96 
99 Some of these changes are substantively significant, “such as to Article Five of the 1971 constitution dealing with political 
parties[…]Presumably, the SCAF only later realized it wanted to amend these clauses, but it did so without any additional 
explanation or justification.” Nathan J. Brown and Kristen Stilt, supra n.96. 
100 Article 61 stated: 
“The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will continue directly with its limited responsibilities following this Declaration, 
until the time at which the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council assume their responsibilities and the president of the 
republic is elected and assumes his/her position.” 
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SCAF could start the process of drafting the constitution within six months of the election of 
chambers of the parliament.101 
Regardless of its questionable procedural legitimacy, the declaration in practice had a number 
of significant repercussions; on the whole, whoever was in power could promulgate an edict 
and call it a constitutional declaration; secondly, it set in motion a roadmap for the transitional 
period. The roadmap provided that a parliament of two chambers were to be elected, the non-
appointed parliamentarians would then elect (within six months of their election) a constituent 
assembly to draft a new constitution (within 6 months of its formation) and then a presidential 
election.102 Therefore, though the SCAF retained its political influence until the end of the 
transition, the parliament was to possess the power of legislation and the competence to elect 
the Egyptian Constituent Assembly (ECA).  
According to the roadmap, consequently, the next step to be followed was the parliamentary 
election. Nevertheless, arguably, prior to the election, Egypt was living a cold war atmosphere 
with three sets of overlapping and conflicting interests. Islamists -mainly Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) and Salafists- intoxicated by their overwhelming success in manipulating a yes vote for 
the March referendum103 were squarely sure about their sweeping victory and demanded to 
run parliamentary elections as soon as possible. However, being aware of the material and 
political weight of the SCAF, they mostly maintained an appeasement approach.104 Civil and 
the so-called revolutionary forces, vanquished in their campaign for a ‘no vote’ for the March 
amendments,105 lacking organizational structure or popular support, were stuck between a 
rock, the SCAF ruling, and a hard place, running elections and incurring defeat before 
Islamists. The SCAF, despite its tremendously rapid drain of popularity,106 could not let the 
army’s institutional interests up in the air to be decided by whoever would come to power.  
Few days prior to the Lower House election a very illuminating development took place. The 
government introduced what became known as Elselmy Document, which contained a set of 
principles to serve as supra-constitutional clauses to restrain the prospective ECA.107 In 
summary, the document granted the army an autonomous status and largely sought to 
preserve a civil character for the state.108 The document provoked wide-spread criticism 
 
101 Article 60 of the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration stated that: 
“The members of the first People’s Assembly and Shura Council (except the appointed members) will meet in a joint session 
following an invitation from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces within 6 months of their election to elect a constituent 
assembly composed of 100 members which will prepare a new draft constitution for the country to be completed within 6 
months of the formation of this assembly. The draft constitution will be presented within 15 days of its preparation to the 
people who will vote in a referendum on the matter. The constitution will take effect from the date on which the people 
approve the referendum.” 
102 Article 60 of the March 2011 Constitutional Declaration, supra n.101. 
103 “Muslim Brotherhood have abused the vote […] they have used the slogan, 'Yes, with Allah', [...] distributing leaflets 
saying that approving the proposed amendments to the constitution is a religious obligation.” Rosemary Sabet, From 
Trafalgar to Tahrir (Authorhouse, 2012), 126; “Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes,” NY Times, accessed March 
6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/2 1/world/middleeast/21egypt.html?pagewanted=all &_r=0.      
104 Nael Shama, Egyptian foreign policy from Mubarak to Morsi: Against the national interest (London; New York: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 223. 
105 Rosemary Sabet, supra n.103, 125-127. 
106 Rosemary Sabet, From Trafalgar to Tahrir, suprasupra n.103, 125 and 129. 
107 Nael Shama, Egyptian foreign policy from Mubarak to Morsi: Against the national interest, supra n.104, 223. 
108  For instance Article one of the document stated that “[T]he Arab republic of Egypt is a civil and democratic state […]” For 
full text of the ELselmy Document see “The Text of the Basic Principles of the Constitution,” Almasry Alyoum, accessed 
March 5, 2014, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/103142. 
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especially and conceivably from the Islamists who viewed the document as lose-lose situation; 
favoring the army and the civil forces.109 Under threats to resort to the street, the government 
declared that the document was advisory and not binding.110 However, in a clear show of force 
Islamists organized a mass protest in Tahrir square. The message was clear; no imposition of 
supra-constitutional principles because they (Islamists) were sure that they would dominate 
the drafting process and they rejected any potential restrictions on their discretion without 
obtaining any benefits in return.111 Other civil and purportedly revolutionary forces, incapable 
of organizing any sizable protest on their own, joined the Islamists’ protest.112 Eventually, 
Islamists left Tahrir square after delivering their message while other forces ended up in 
bloody clashes with the security forces in what is widely known as Mohamed Mahmoud 
Confrontations.113 Therefore, while the Islamists showed considerable ability to mobilize the 
street, self-claimed revolutionary forces were consumed in street clashes with no clear agenda 
nor popular support and apparent failure to prepare for the parliamentary election.114 
2. Remarks on the First Stage of the Transition 
Unlike Tunisia, the Egyptian army was the ruler of the first transitional period. The legitimacy 
of the SCAF’s role was hardly challenged in the beginning given its reported role in toppling 
Mubarak and popular perception of the army as the country’s savior. The warm reception of 
the army led to the SCAF’s refusal to hand over power to a presidential council.115 In fact, the 
SCAF’s deluded confidence in unconditional popular support led to its full embroilment in 
politics. Nevertheless, as the SCAF was part and parcel of the political fray pursuing its 
interests, it quickly became an easy target for political onslaught. In addition, instances of 
disproportionate use of force and sheer scale of insecurity rendered the SCAF’s administration 
incompetent causing a tremendous legitimacy drain that could not be harnessed by its farcical 
constitutional declarations.  
For Islamists, the vehement pursuit of political Islam, in the run up for March referendum, to 
turn rivalry into an ideological one rather than political was indicative that a political 
coexistence between civil and religious forces in Egypt was by default evasive.116 To rub salt in 
the wound, the misadministration of the SCAF further worsened the case. The failure to 
engage a body representative of various social and political forces (similar to the Tunisian High 
Commission) in the administration of the transitional period majorly harmed the SCAF itself, 
undermined civil forces and paved the way for street mobilization and mass protests. Faced by 
 
109 Nael Shama, supra n.104, 223. 
110 "Islamists Lead a Massive Protest in Cairo," The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052970203611404577046093603733830?mg= 0.html 
111 See “Egypt's Islamists dominate Tahrir Square's dense Friday protest,” Ahram online, accessed March 5, 2014, http:// 
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/26902/Egypt/Politics-/Islamists-dominate-Egypts-Tahrir-Squares-dense-Fri.aspx. 
112 See "Islamists Lead a Massive Protest in Cairo," supra n.110; “Egypt's Islamists dominate Tahrir Square's dense Friday 
protest,” supra n.111. 
113 Nael Shama, supra n.104, 223. 
114 Despite that liberal forces would have relatively benefited from Elslemy Document, they joined the Islamists’ protests and 
ended up, without the Islamists, clashing with the security forces. Unlike Islamists, their demands were unclear, marred with 
violence and ignored the upcoming parliamentary elections. Contrary to this opinion, some perceive these aimless 
confrontations to be Egypt’s second revolution. See Nael Shama, supra n.104, 223-224.  
115 The demand of forming a presidential council to run the country instead of the SCAF was strongly pursued by a number 
of political actors. Mohamed El-Bendary, The Egyptian Revolution: Between hope and despair: Mubarak to Morsi (New 
York: Algora Publishing, 2013), 148. 
116 Rosemary Sabet, supra n.103, 126. 
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their inability to compete either politically or at the street level (protests), the so-called 
revolutionary forces devoted their efforts to media talks, pointless confrontations with security 
forces or, sometimes, pressing for demands that would only benefit political Islam.117 The fine 
lines between freedom, chaos, and anarchy were repeatedly crossed amid praise of the 
secularly-oriented media.118 Moreover, disregarding Article four of the army’s declaration 
which banned “exercising any political activity or establishing political parties on a religious 
foundation […]” allowed political Islam to fully display its force whether in its propaganda or 
in the establishment of religious-oriented political parties.119  
Lastly, the parliament was assigned to elect the ECA. Therefore, political Islam was not only 
given the mandate to legislate but also to draft the country’s constitution; a conclusion that was 
enough, per se, to exacerbate the acrimony between religious\non-religious forces and fuelled 
an allegation that the SCAF conducted an illicit deal with the MB.120 
3. Early Confrontation: Islamists versus Judiciary 
As expected, after a lengthy parliamentary election, the MB led coalition and the Islamic bloc 
won 47% and 27% of the Lower Chamber and 47% and 25% of the Upper house seats121 
respectively.122 After such political annihilation, in practice, taking about consensus seemed to 
be illusionist. Especially after the political alliance between the MB and the Islamic bloc 
(mainly the Salafist Al-Nour party). Therefore, it was no surprise that the parliament elected an 
ECA dominated by Islamists.123 In the meanwhile, the parliament started to adopt an anti-
judiciary rhetoric, calling for its cleansing and the sacking of the attorney general.124 Although 
it was no more than non-binding speeches or recommendations, it created a feeling that the 
judiciary was next, after sidelining civil and liberal forces. Yet, the first direct confrontation 
took place when the Egypt’s Administrative Court ruled the dissolution of the ECA on the 
basis that its members should not be the same members of parliament.125 The decision raised 
questions about the competence of the Administrative Court to disqualify a parliamentary act. 
Nevertheless, the decision was not challenged.126 
 
117 For instance, early 2012 some of the youth and non-Islamic forces were protesting to force the SCAF to hand over power to 
the head of the Lower House, SAAD Elkatatny, who hailed from the MB. Amre Elshobaky, “A Revolution of Lost 
Opportunities,” Alarabiya, (in Arabic), accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/politics/2014/01/23/ ةرو ث-صرف لا-
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egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/29/results-of-shura-council-elections. 
122 “The High Commission Declares the Results for the Lower House Lists [...] FJP 127, Al-Nour 96 and Elkotla 33,” ALmasry 
Alyoum (in Arabic), accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details /146347. 
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Paradoxically, the composition of the second ECA again included members of parliament127 
which led many observers to expect a second dissolution of the ECA.128 In fact, a dissolution 
decision was on the horizon, but this time targeting the Lower Chamber. In June 2011, the 
Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) issued a decision disbanding the Lower Chamber due to 
the unconstitutionality of the parliamentary electoral law.129 The SCC decided that the electoral 
law violated Art 38 of the constitutional declaration which stated that “the law shall organize 
the right of nomination to both Councils of People [Lower Chamber] and Consultation [Upper 
Chamber] pursuant to an electoral system that combines closed parties lists and individual 
system with two-thirds percentage [devoted] for the first and the remaining one-third for the 
second.” 130 Contrary to the article, the repealed law allowed political parties to run for all the 
seats, including the one-third devoted to individual nominees. Therefore, according to the 
SCC, and a neutral reading of the article, the law violated the constitutional article.   
Nevertheless, the Islamists deemed the decision a stab in the back for a number of valid 
considerations. Firstly and most importantly, the decision could have invalidated the result for 
the one-third of the seats- for which the electoral law contravened the constitutional restriction 
allowing political parties to run for seats allocated for independent candidates- and upheld the 
other two-thirds. Dissolving the entire parliament seemed to be a judicial encroachment on the 
legislature especially that the Court’s justification for nullifying the parties’ two-thirds was 
largely based on logic not law.131 Moreover, the decision came against a backdrop of rising 
tension between the MB, on one hand, and the SCAF and the judiciary on the other.132 
Consequently, the decision largely appeared retaliatory or even politicized.133 Thirdly, 
although it is true that the decision was not without a precedent or legal validity,134 the 2011 
parliament was a genuinely democratically elected parliament, unlike its predecessors. 
Therefore, even given the unconstitutionality of the law, overriding the expressed will of 
millions of voters due to a legislative error could objectively be considered manipulative and 
undemocratic. Be that as it may, the Lower Chamber was dissolved with expectations for the 
Upper House, which was formed pursuant to the same unconstitutional law, to face the same 
destiny. 
 
127 “The second Constituent Assembly has been dogged by similar legal challenges [the one that dissolved the first].” William 
Partlett, "Constitution-Making by ‘We the Majority’ in Egypt," Brookings, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/ 
blogs/up-front/posts/2012/11/30-constitution-egypt-partlett. 
128 The legality of the second ECA was referred to the SCC in October 2013. “Egypt’s constitutional assembly case referred to 
Supreme Court,” Alarabiya, accessed March 6, 2014, http://english.alarabiya.ne t/articles/ 2012/10/23/245476.html; Paul 
Danahar, supra n.92, 109. 
129 Bassam Tibi, The Sharia state: Arab Spring and democratization (London: Routledge), 141. 
130 Originally this Article gave the legislature the discretion to decide any electoral system for the parliamentary elections. 
However, on 25 December 2011, the SCAF issued a second constitutional declaration to amend this Article. 
131 The SCC stated that the competition of political parties on the one third, which was devoted to individual candidates, had 
affected the formation of the political parties’ lists for the other two-thirds. “The Reasons for Disolving the People's 
Assembly,” (in Arabic) Al-Watan, accessed March 6, 2014, http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/15636. 
132 Before the dissolution decision, the MB made assertions that the SCAF threatened to dissolve the government if the MB 
and its political party continued their insistence to dismiss the government. “MPs inch closer to vote of no-confidence in El-
Ganzouri government” Ahramonline, accessed March 5, 2014, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/38042/ 
Egypt/Politics-/MPs-inch-closer-to-vote-of-noconfidence-in-ElGanzo.aspx. 
133 Paul Danahar, supra n.92, 109. 
134  The SCC “in 1987 and 1990 it forced the dissolution of parliament on precisely such grounds. (It struck down the 
parliamentary electoral framework a third time in 2000 on different grounds.)” Nathan Brown, “Judicial Turbulence Ahead 
in Egypt, Fasten Your Seat Belts,” Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, accessed March 5, 2014, http:// 
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4. A Wasted Opportunity of Reconciliation 
In the meanwhile, the country was consumed with a confrontation of a different type; the 
second round of the presidential election between the MB’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi and 
Mubarak’s last serving prime minister, Ahmed Shafeik. Apart from the adherents of political 
Islam, the country was almost divided between the appeal of stability, promised by Shafeik, 
and the fear of restoring Mubarak’s regime. The former fear was common between both 
Islamists and civil forces. Being mindful of the ferocity of the second round, both camps 
(Islamists and civil) seized the rare opportunity and exchanged promises of support and 
reconciliation. In the Fairmont meeting, named after the hotel where it was held, many 
representatives of the civil forces declared their clear support of Morsi and the MB, on their 
part, promised to reconsider the composition of the CA to be more representative of Egypt’s 
various forces.135 Acting on its own, the SCAF continued its ludicrous tradition, and on the eve 
of the final day of the presidential election declared the fourth of its so-called constitutional 
declarations.136 The edict reassigned the legislative power to the SCAF until the election of a 
parliament and provided immunity for SCAF’s officials.137 
A few days later, the winner of the presidency was declared; Morsi with a razor-thin margin, 
51.73%,138 became Egypt’s first democratically elected president in a free election. Morsi’s 
victory temporarily ended the bitter division between pro- and anti-Islamists with hopes that 
the new president might work on healing the social rift in Egyptian society. Unlike Morsi’s 
unsuccessful and controversial step of re-establishing the dissolved parliament,139 his decision 
to abolish the SCAF’s latest edict quickly portrayed him as a capable and courageous 
president.140 By the same token, Morsi issued an edict, also calling it a constitutional 
declaration, claiming the SCAF’s legislative power for himself and abolishing the SCAF’s 
immunity.141 Immediately after, Morsi sacked the long sitting Minister of Defense, army 
commander of chief and other top officers, and appointed Abdel-Fatah El-Sisi as the new 
Defense Minister.142  
Morsi’s edict was widely praised amid claims that it put an end to the protracted political role 
of the army. To a high extent, Morsi benefited from the temporary alliance with civil forces and 
the collapsing popularity of the SCAF and the army’s political interference. Therefore, hardly 
anyone did question the authority of his edict especially that it came on the ruins of another 
self-claimed, unpopular declaration. However, it seemed that Morsi disregarded these factors 
and believed that he, per se, could actually have become a constitutional authority. Although 
Morsi at this point possessed both executive and legislative powers, by the virtue of his first 
edict, he issued a second one. Again calling it a constitutional declaration, this time Morsi 
 
135 “Once election allies, Egypt's 'Fairmont' opposition turn against Morsi,” Ahram online, accessed March 5, 2014, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/152/74485/Egypt/Morsi,-one-year-on/-Once-election-allies,-Egypts-Fairmont-
opposition-.aspx 
136 Nael Shama, supra n.104, 222. 
137 Nael Shama, supra n.104, 222. 
138 Elections in Egypt: The Electoral Framework in Egypt’s Continuing Transition: February 2011 – September 2013, supra 
n.94, 6. 
139 Bassam Tibi, supra n.129, 142. 
140 Nael Shama, supra n.104, 222.  
141 Nael Shama, supra n.104, 222. 
142 Nael Shama, supra n.104, 222. 
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granted himself powers that were never, at least overtly, available to any of Egypt’s presidents 
including the SCAF. The Reichstag Fire-type edict stated that: 
Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decisions made by the president since 
he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People’s 
Assembly [Lower Chamber] is elected, are final and binding by themselves and cannot be 
appealed by any way or before any entity. Nor shall they be suspended or cancelled and all 
lawsuits related to them and brought before any judicial body against these decisions are 
expired. (Article two) [Emphasis added] 
No judicial body can dissolve the Consultative Council [Upper Chamber] or the 
Constituent Assembly. (Article five) 
In other words, after two edicts, Morsi wanted to possess unquestionable constitutional, 
legislative, executive, and administrative competences. With no need for deep analysis, this 
edict was a cure for all the fears of political Islam. There was a fear of dissolving the ECA 
because its second formation included members of parliament which, as already mentioned, 
was the same reason for dissolving the first ECA, and the 6-month period for drafting a 
constitution was about to expire. Besides, the unconstitutional electoral law that led to the 
dissolution of the Lower Chamber was the same law that applied to the Upper Chamber and 
thus the dissolution of the latter was inevitable.143 Accordingly Article five came to stem these 
fears. Moreover, shielding Morsi’s decisions against any review or scrutiny was construed as a 
pretext to, at the least, re-establish the dissolved Lower Chamber. The edict was thus seen as a 
letter of intention of the MB that ended the short-lived honeymoon with civil forces, and 
threatened state institutions and a wide segment of Egyptians.144 However, shortly under the 
pressure of popular protests, Morsi issued his third and last constitutional declaration that 
repealed the earlier one.145  
5. 2012 Constitution: Reasons of Failure 
Failing to impose the dictatorial edict, Morsi and the MB followed a different two-pronged 
approach; the threatened ECA had to finish the draft constitution as soon as possible and the 
judiciary had to be silenced. To this end, seeking consensus was not on the agenda; therefore, 
representatives of other forces, frustrated by the process of drafting, withdrew from the ECA.146 
Instead of seeking reconciliation, the withdrawn representatives were quickly replaced by 
compliant members and a draft constitution was ready before the deadline. The hasty drafting 
process was most ironically manifested in the travesty that Christian Copts in the ECA were 
eventually represented by a Muslim named Mohamed.147 Secondly, to stem the fear of any 
 
143 Daniel L. Tavana, “Party Proliferation and Electoral Transition in Post-Mubarak Egypt,” in George Joffé (ed.) North 
Africa's Arab Spring (London: Routledge, 2013), 55.  
144 "Egyptians stage mass protests against Morsi edict," The Washington Post, accessed March 5, 2014 http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egyptians-stage-mass-protests-against-morsi-edict/2012/11/27/166d71ca-38c4-11e2-
b01f-5f55b193f58f_story.html. 
145 “A look back at Mohamed Morsi's tumultuous year” CCTV, accessed March 5, 2014, http://english.cntv.cn/ 
program/bizasiaamerica/20130704/102643.shtmlhttp://english.cntv.cn/program/bizasiaamerica/20130704/102643.shtml. 
146 “Complaints about Islamist domination of the constituent assembly had led to mass resignations by non-Islamist members 
and excoriating commentary in the Egyptian public sphere.” The Battle for Egypt's Constitution (Project on Middle East 
Democracy, January, 2013), 2.  
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undesirable judicial decisions, the supporters of political Islam cast a watertight besiege on the 
SCC to prevent its justices from entering the court until the adoption of a new constitution.148 
In summary, the drafting process of the 2012 Constitution was marred by exclusion and 
physical transgression on state institutions. Nevertheless, the draft was approved by 63% in a 
popular referendum.149 The 2012 Constitution itself was accused numerously of creating a 
theocratic state. However, an objective reading may reveal that its articles exhibited a “stronger 
emphasis on religion than the 1971 constitution, yet its character is [was] largely secular.”150 
The Constitution was conservative, perhaps patriarchal,151 but was not designed to turn the 
state overnight into a theocracy. Arguably, its main problem for Egyptians was its creation 
process and the political performance that followed its genesis.  
In fact, the conduct of Morsi and his group (MB) was not any different from that of the ECA. 
Even the main Salafist party, Al-Nour, broke alliance with MB due to allegations of exclusion 
and MB monopoly.152 By the end of Morsi’s one year in office, it appeared that Morsi and MB 
were threatening opponents through alliances with groups that have black records in violence 
and terrorism.153 In one of his last decisions, Morsi crossed the lines of absurdity and appointed 
a governor to the touristic city of Luxor who hailed from the very same group (Gamaa Islamia) 
that committed the most heinous terrorist attack against tourists, in the modern history of 
Egypt, in the very same city of Luxor.154 The instances where political Islam in general, and MB 
in particular, physically and verbally, indirectly and indirectly, threatened their opponents 
whether citizens, politicians or state institutions are beyond the scope of this research. 
However, they were significant enough to loom over and further stigmatize the Constitution of 
2012 regardless of its content. 
Egypt was marred with a regime acted dictatorially but lacked the qualifications of a 
dictatorship. The MB regime antagonized state institutions without having control over them, 
failed on economic and security fronts, alienated most of the segments of the society and 
paradoxically, commanded support, and claimed democratic mandate. The electoral and 
 
148 “Supreme Constitutional Court besieged again,” Daily News Egypt, accessed March 5, 2014, www.dailynewsegypt.com/ 
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Egypt-s-Muslim-Brotherhood.html. 
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constitutional legitimacy largely appeared as tools to impose submission, not governance. In 
such context, the June 30th protests, the pretext for Morsi’s ouster, seemed inevitable. Three 
days after millions of Egyptians took to the streets,155 the army declared the ouster of Morsi.156 
Regardless of whether it was a coup, good coup,157 or an answer to people’s appeal, the army 
movement was largely justified, widely supported, and restarted the transitional period.158  
6. A Second Period of Transition 
During the same speech declaring Morsi’s removal, the Defense Minister announced the 
suspension of the 2012 Constitution and the intention to form a committee of experts to amend 
it.159 Learning from the SCAF’s tumultuous experience, this time the power was handed over to 
an interim president, the head of the SCC who assumed the power to issue constitutional 
declarations,160 and a civilian government. On July 8, the interim president declared the 
governing constitutional declaration which included the roadmap for the transitional period: a 
committee of 10 experts to suggest amendments to the 2012 Constitution;161 a committee of 50 
representing a spectrum of socio-polecat powers to review the suggested amendments162 then, 
after the adoption of the Constitution, holding parliamentary and presidential elections.163  
Quickly, in contrast to the media coverage of dispersing violent protests during the SCAF and 
Morsi rulings,164 “Most private outlets embraced the government crackdown on Morsi 
supporters, including by adopting almost verbatim the government’s defense of its actions.”165 
The killing of more than 50 protestors in front of the club of the republican guards166 was 
justified due the aggression of the protestors and their attempt to break into the social club 
 
155 “We’ve covered a lot of protests in Egypt since the fall of President Hosni Mubarak, but the last time we’d seen anything 
on this massive scale was in the days following Jan. 25, 2011, when the revolution started against him.” “Reporter’s 
Notebook: Millions March in Egypt Protests,” ABC News, accessed March 5, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/ 
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156 Elections in Egypt: The Electoral Framework in Egypt’s Continuing Transition: February 2011 – September 2013, supra n. 
94, 1. 
157 For the concept of good coups see Francis Ikome, Good coups and bad coups: The limits of the African Union's injunction 
on unconstitutional changes of power in Africa (Johannesburg, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2007). 
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carrying weapons.167 Similar was the coverage of the breaking up of the MB’s supporters’ sit-in 
in Raba, which led to the death of hundreds of protestors and tens of officers.168 In such an 
atmosphere and severe mood shift the 2014 constitution was drafted.  
To the credit of the drafting committee, it represented a wide spectrum of societal forces.169 
However, apart from the one representative of Al-Nour party, the force that once occupied 
around 75% of the Lower Chamber vanished into thin air.170 In a dramatic reverse, the power 
that once excluded everyone was eventually excluded. On January 2014, the draft constitution 
went through Egypt’s third constitutional referendum after the 2011 revolution, where it was 
passed with 98% of the votes.171 Despite what seems an absurd percentage there is little 
evidence that the voting was rigged, especially because opponents (namely the MB supporters) 
boycotted the referendum due to their non-recognition of the whole process, giving the high 
percentage of support a considerable credibility.172  
Ironically, liberal and civil forces who unwaveringly lamented the so-called deal between the 
SCAF and the MB have offered in the current constitution the same, if not more, advantages to 
the army. In this regard, Article 234 of the 2014 Constitution, which states that “[t]he 
appointment of the Defense Minister shall take place after the approval of the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Force [...],” imposes an unprecedented restriction on the president’s discretion to 
appoint the Defense Minister. Accordingly, it turned out that what the liberals and civil powers 
lamented was not the deal but the fact, if such purported deal existed, that they were not part 
of it. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
The Tunisian ban on radical groups to form political parties turned out to be crucial for 
democratic transition, whereas permitting radical groups and religious demagogue in the 
Egyptian case gave these groups political meritocracy while lacking genuine belief in 
democracy. Therefore, as intrusive as it may appear, it turned out that banning radical groups 
or religious propaganda from politics could enhance weak and newly born democracies and 
not the opposite. Comparing the Tunisian and the Egyptian cases may give further credit to the 
concept of “Militant Democracy.”173 
Moreover, Tunisia, which is highly deemed to be a success story, did not hold any public 
referenda. Egypt, on the other hand, conducted three overwhelmingly supported constitutional 
referenda and is still wading through a protracted transition. This fact, per se, may call to 
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reconsider the significance of referenda of technical nature, such as a constitutional 
referendum, in a post-conflict society with a high illiteracy rate like Egypt. Similarly, the mere 
focus on electoral victory as a sole indicator on democracy and legitimacy may need to be re-
evaluated. “[I]t seems evident that merely holding elections is insufficient and that additional 
institutional mechanisms in the form of constitutional restraints are necessary to make it 
work.”174 Morsi’s second declaration considerably revealed a disingenuous belief in democratic 
governance. Accordingly, there was a legitimate fear that Egypt was heading towards 
majoritarian tyranny rather than a constitutional democracy especially that “[t]here is strong 
empirical evidence that constitutional liberalism will in time lead towards democracy, but 
democracy on its own will not necessarily bring constitutional liberalism.”175 Consequently, 
following the promulgation of Morsi’s second edict, it was reasonable for a segment of the 
society to regard the democratically elected president as an illegitimate ruler who was seeking 
concentration of all power in his hands. By the same token, after Morsi’s ouster, the 
uninvestigated killing of a number of the MB supporters flagrantly contradicted the most basic 
principles of accountability and rule of law.176  
Therefore, arguably, the lack of confidence in the governing regime’s commitment to 
democratic values and the exclusion of the other were among the main reasons that detracted 
from the normative value of both the 2012 and 2014 Constitutions. Contrary to the current 
Tunisian constitution which appeared to be an outcome of a consensual reconciliatory process, 
the two Egyptian constitutions were recognized as an expression of victory of one force over 
another; the 2012 Constitution expressed the dominance of a new political power, the Islamists, 
whereas the 2014 Constitution established a system of powerful and autonomous state 
institutions including, but not limited to, the army.177 It is not particularly that the 2012 and 
2014 Constitutions were ideologically divergent. The two Constitutions maintained both the 
precedence of principles of Islamic Shari’a as the main source of legislation,178 and, at the same 
time, the secular character of the state. Accordingly, it was more about the modes operandi of 
the drafting processes and the political environment rather than the actual constitutional texts 
that affected the perception of the two constitutions. Egypt, to a high extend, has empirically 
proven that if “the constituent power is used in order to entrench the political programme of 
the majority and thus exclude the programmes of competing political forces, an important 
benefit of constitutionalism, namely the possibility of peaceful change, is put at risk.”179  
Related to the prospects of constitutional implementation, it was insightful that when the 
constitutional process in Tunisia reached a stalemate, civil society (specifically the labor union 
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and the lawyers’ syndicate) together with an increasingly organized opposition played a major 
role in reaching a breakthrough agreement. On the contrary, when Egyptians lost faith in the 
SCAF they voted for the Islamists and when they lost faith in the Islamists they again turned to 
the army, with no mention of a political party, syndicate or union. What Egypt has been 
undergoing can hardly be categorized as a political struggle because Egypt so far has not had a 
political alternative for the Islamists or the army yet. Part of this could be attributed to the 
pervasive supra-natural savior mentality; the need for a divinely-supported savior or an army 
supported officer. Where the person who believes in the former is an Islamist, the latter 
category can include politicians, writers and, ironically, liberals. This analysis may justify, to a 
certain extent, liberals’ shameless support of the army180 and the strenuous attempt to depict 
El-Sisi as an incarnation of Nasser.181 Unfortunately, three years after Mubarak’s fall, the 
impotence of civil political parties can hardly be attributed to Mubarak’s iron-fisted regime 
anymore. 
In this regard, Mancur Olson contends in his examination of the logic of collective actions that: 
It does not follow that because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they 
achieved their group objective that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they 
were all rational and self-interested. Indeed unless the number of individuals in a group is 
quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in 
their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common 
or group interests.182 [Emphasis added] 
Applying this analysis on the Egyptian case, it could be argued that both Islamists and state 
institutions in Egypt have the advantages of having a limited number of members, when 
compared to the society, and a degree of physical and/or physiological coercion on their 
members through exploiting religious zealotry, appeal of group affiliation, disciplinary 
measures, institutional loyalty, nationalistic rhetoric, etc. On the other hand, it appears that the 
mechanism or the ‘special device’ that can translate youth activism and popular dynamism 
into a political reality is largely missing. Despite that most of these movements have rational 
demands; mainly democratic governance and social justice, they are unable to materialize into 
a robust political party or even a lobby. Tunisia, through its professional syndicates and 
unions, and the emergence of Nida Tounis was able to provide a real competitor for the 
Islamists and thus balancing the political arena.  
Nevertheless, the Egyptian Constitution of 2014 represents a new political structure where 
power is not concentrated in a single entity or person but rather distributed among a number 
of state institutions.183 With this structural change, and expected continuity of youth dynamism 
and economic pressure, the 2014 Constitution may accommodate the principle of checks and 
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balances leading to a sort of democratic accountability. “It could well happen that a 
constitution that fell short of achievement developed into a full-fledged constitution over time 
[…]”184 However, this leap forward is conditional on one prerequisite; having political parties 
that can convert enthusiasm and popular engagement into politics. Regarding Tunisia, though 
it is too early to say that Tunisia has made a successful democratic transition, the culture of 
consensus created during the drafting process is likely to enable the already progressive 
constitution of 2014 to establish a constitutional democracy.  
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